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THE UNCERTAIN LEGACY OF RASUL V. BUSH
BradfordA. Berensont
I am going to focus my remarks this morning primarily on one of the three
major enemy combatant decisions that the U.S. Supreme Court handed down last
June. The Rasul v. Bush' decision, which related to the detainees held at
Guantanamo Bay, posed the question of what rights of access the Guantanamo
detainees have to our federal courts to challenge their detentions.
I would like to start with a riddle. What do the following four things have
in common: First, a theater military commander in the midst of a hot war
spending hours on the telephone with lawyers from the Department of Justice
rather than with his subordinate commanders in the field who are carrying the
fight to the enemy; second, an Al Qaeda terrorist bringing a civil suit against our
Secretary of Defense and doing so with a lawyer paid for by United States
taxpayers; third, an Al Qaeda terrorist receiving some of our nation's most
highly classified information, information classified above Top Secret, at the
SCI (Sensitive Compartmented Information) level; and fourth, a captured
terrorist being released by the United States in order to return to the fight against
the U.S. and to continue trying to kill our soldiers and our allies? The answer is
that all four of those things are gifts potentially bestowed upon us by the U.S.
Supreme Court through its Rasul decision last June.
I imagine that there are those of you in the audience right now who are
saying, "Come on, those things are absurd and far-fetched." Well, I agree with
you on the absurd part, but they are not far-fetched. Several of them are
happening right now, and whether the others happen depends only upon the
outcome of the litigation currently before the United States District Court for the

t Former Associate Counsel to President George W. Bush, Partner, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood,
LLP. This is an edited transcript of a presentation delivered as part of the 2004 University of Tulsa
College of Law Symposium: InternationalLaw and the 2003-04 Supreme Court Tenn: Building
Bridges or ConstructingBarriersBetween National, Foreign, and International Law?
1. 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
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District of Columbia. With that as a starting point, I would like to advance three
propositions about the Rasul case and its impact.
The first is that the interesting question from Rasul is not what international
law did to the U.S. Supreme Court - in other words, what effect international
law had on the Court's adjudication of that case. Rather, the interesting question
is what effect the U.S. Supreme Court's decision is going to have on international law.
The second proposition is that the decision in Rasul was important less for
what it resolved than for what it did not resolve. Almost all of the important and
difficult questions that will help us to determine the long-term impact of that
decision on the United States and on international law have actually been left to
be decided in subsequent rounds of litigation, primarily in the lower federal
courts and potentially in future cases before the U.S. Supreme Court.
The final proposition is that if the questions left outstanding by Rasul are
resolved incorrectly (at least in a way that I would consider to be incorrect), then
Rasul could precipitate a true disaster for American national security. Let me
briefly expand upon these three points.
First, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Rasul was notable for having
foregone reliance on international law in rendering its decision. The petitioners
and numerous amici invited the Court to continue the trend from last term's
Lawrence2 decision, and other cases, 3 and rely, at least to some degree, on
international law, whether in the form of customary international law, the
Geneva Conventions, or other, more exotic international agreements and
declarations.
Yet the Court resolutely (and intentionally) declined this
invitation. As you read the opinions, you will note that from the majority
opinion right through the dissents, the argument is very much about habeas
corpus jurisdiction, about the scope of our federal habeas statute, about previous
U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting that statute, about the Suspension
Clause, 4 and the like. No significant aspect of the Court's decision relied in any
way on international law norms or the international law obligations of the United
States.
I believe that the Court, adjudicating the case in the way that it did, created
an absolutely unheard-of right in international law. Thus, although the Court did
not allow international law to enter into its decision making, it has now placed a
very significant data point on the map that might echo back into international
law elsewhere. There was absolutely no precedent - I argue none, from any
court, any jurisdiction, any country in the world - for allowing alien enemy

2. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
3. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S.
677, 700 (1900); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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combatants being held abroad by a nation's military in the course of an active
armed conflict to have recourse to the domestic courts of that country, to sue the
leader of that country, and to challenge their detention. Military law and the
international law of armed conflict prior to Rasul simply did not admit such a
principle.
The U.S. Supreme Court, for the first time, has opened the door a crack to
that notion. During World War II, we held about 380,000 Axis prisoners of war
on our soil in P.O.W. camps. 5 Although a handful may have tried to file habeas
petitions, none was successful in bringing a habeas action against President
Roosevelt or his Secretary of War. In older, more sensible times, such an
accommodation to presumed enemies in time of war was properly regarded as
ludicrous, and the U.S. Supreme Court expressly held that no habeas jurisdiction
existed Sover6 alien enemies held abroad just a few years later in Johnson v.
Eisentrager. Settled law provides that alien enemies, during the course of war,
do not even have the right to come into our court to sue on ordinary commercial
contracts. 7 That includes alien enemy civilians: they are simply disabled from
availing themselves of our judicial system by virtue of their loyalty and
adherence to our enemies. 8 They do not have the privilege of litigation in our
courts. There is also no judicial redress for the damage that the United States (or
any other nation at war) inflicts during combat, even when that damage is
collateral, i.e. when it deprives complete innocents of their lives, health, or
property. 9 Thus, to hold, as the U.S. Supreme Court did, that the people we are
detaining at Guantanamo Bay - the vast majority of whom, by any reasonable
interpretation of the facts, are active enemies of the United States fighting
against us militarily - have the right to come into our courts and sue the
Secretary of Defense and call him to account at the same time he is trying to
wage war against their brethren in foreign fields of battle is a dramatic and truly
radical step.
Just how damaging to the security interests of the United States that decision turns out to be really depends on the questions left unresolved in Rasul.
These questions include almost all the really important ones apart from the
existence of jurisdiction itself.

5. Lynn Ermann, Learning Freedom in Captivity, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2004, at W16.
6. 339 U.S. 763, 776 (1950).
7. See, e.g., id. at 776; Exparte Colonna, 314 U.S. 510, 511 (1942) (per curiam); Masterson v.
Howard, 85 U.S. 99, 105 (1873); Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 532, 536-39; 50 U.S.C. app. § 7(b)
(2002).
8. 50 U.S.C. app. § 7(b) (2002).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952); United States v.
Pacific R.R., 120 U.S. 227 (1887); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2003) ("combatant activities"
exception to Federal Tort Claims Act).
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The first of these questions is what substantive rights enemy detainees will
be able to assert in habeas corpus proceedings. The U.S. Supreme Court
recognized that there was habeas jurisdiction, but it said nothing or very little
about what claims the habeas courts could hear.10 There is some debate about
whether footnote 15 in the Court's decision, which suggests that long-term
military detention without charges violates U.S. law, pours a little wine into the
bottle, but it is not at all clear that it does. 1 1 Thus there is considerable
uncertainty about what the detainees will actually be doing in their habeas
proceedings.
The position the U.S. government has taken so
far is that the detainees have
S 12
no substantive rights to assert in these proceedings.
Interestingly, as broad as
the Rasul decision is, Justice Steven's final paragraph opens with a sentence that
says, "Whether... further proceedings may become necessary after respondents
make their response to the merits of petitioners' claims are matters that we need
not address now." 13 The government is placing a lot of reliance on that,
suggesting that the Rasul decision leaves open the possibility that there will not
be habeas corpus proceedings even though there is habeas corpus jurisdiction in
the abstract, and that there is no private right possessed by the detainees of which
the federal courts can take cognizance. This is obviously an ambitious reading
of Rasul and one that is unlikely to find favor in the lower courts.
In the alternative, the government contends that if a detainee goes through
the Combatant Status Review Tribunal 14 process, he has no further rights under
the U.S. Constitution or under international law to assert in the course of the
habeas proceeding.15 The Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) are

10, Rasul, 124 S. Ct. 2686.
11. Id. at 2698 n. 15.
12. See, e.g., Response to Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion to Dismiss or for
Judgment as a Matter of Law and Memorandum in Support, Hicks v. Bush, No. 02-CV-0299
(CKK), slip op. at 19-30 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 4, 2004) (on file with author).
13. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2699.

14. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, ORDER
ESTABLISHING COMBATANT STATUS REvIEw TRIBUNAL (July 7, 2004) available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2005)
(establishing this tribunal) [hereinafter MEMO FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY]; see also
Combatant Status Review Tribunals, U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, July 7, 2004, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2OO4/d2OO40707factsheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2005)
(descibing the reasoning for the tribunal, the processes of the tribunal, and the hearings of the
tribunal).
15. See, e.g., Supplemental Memornandum of Law in Support of Respondents' Motion to Dismiss
or for Judgment as a Matter of Law Pursuant toCour's December 2,2004 Order, Khalid v. Bush,
No. 1:04-CV- 1142 (RJL), slip op. at 8-12 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 2004)(on file with author). In the first
ruling on the merits of Guantanamo Detainees' habeas petitions, Judge Richard Leon of the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia accepted this position of the government and
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panels of neutral military officers, akin to those that the detainees would be
entitled to under Article V of the Third Geneva Convention 16 if those Conventions applied, that sit to review whether the detainees have been appropriately
classified as combatants subject to the laws of war. 1 7 Thus, the government
takes the position that the only right possessed by an alien enemy combatant

being held abroad is to have a neutral military tribunal make a factual
determination that he is in fact properly classified as an enemy combatant. 18 The
purpose of the habeas review, according to this argument, is simply to ensure
that such process is afforded and fairly administered by the military. In practice,
this means that once the federal courts have blessed the basic structure and
procedures of the CSRTs as consistent with due process and international law,
further habeas proceedings should be de minimis affairs.' 9 Future habeas
petitions would be easily dismissed without significant adversarial or court
proceedings after the government's return avers that the detainee in question
received the CSRT process he was due and was found by the CSRT to be
properly classified.

The diametrically opposite view is being taken by the detainees and their
counsel. Many of them are espousing the view that they have almost the full
complement of rights under the •U.S.
20 Constitution that a U.S. citizen would have

in ordinary criminal proceedings.

They also claim a robust suite of rights

under a variety of sources of international law. 21 According to the detainees and
denied the detainees' petitions. Khalid v. Bush, Nos. 1:04-1142 (RJL), 1:04-1162 (RJL) (D.D.C.
Jan. 19, 2005).
16. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 5,972
U.N.T.S. 136, 140-42.
17. See MEMO FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, supra note 13; Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Public Affairs), News Release, Administrative Review Implementation Directive
Issued, U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, Sept. 15, 2004, availableat
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040915-1253.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2005).
18. See, e.g., Supplemental Memornandum of Law In Support of Respondents' Motion To
Dismiss Or For Judgment As A Matter Of Law Pursuant To The Court's December 2, 2004 Order,
Khalid (No. 1:04-cv-1142), slip op. at 8-12 (on file with author).
19. In direct conflict with Judge Leon's ruling, see supra note 15, Judge Joyce Hens Green of the
D.C. District Court recently rejected the adequacy of the CSRT procedures under the Due Process
Clause, finding that the Constitution entitles the detainees to fuller hearings in district court habeas
proceedings. See Memorandum Opinion Denying In Part And Granting In Part Respondents'
Motion To Dismiss Or For Judgment As A Matter Of Law, In re Guantdnamo Detainee Cases, No.
02-CV-00828 (CKK) (D.D.C. filed Jan. 31, 2005) (on file with author). The proper role of the
CSRTs in the overall process of legal review is clearly destined for decision by the D.C. Circuit
and perhaps the Supreme Court.
20. See, e.g., Petitioner's Memorandum in Opposition to Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, In re
Guantdnamo Detainees, No. 02-CV-00828 (CKK), slip op. at 28-40 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 5, 2004)
(on file with author).
21. See id. at 17-27.
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their counsel, the claims they may press in support of their freedom in the postRasul habeas proceedings are almost unlimited. The extent to which these postRasul habeas proceedings become an intolerable burden on the military effort
and result in the erroneous release of dangerous terrorists hinges in large part on
how broadly or narrowly the lower courts define the rights cognizable in these
proceedings.
The second big unanswered question is related: to what extent are the
determinations made by CSRTs entitled to deference in subsequent habeas
proceedings? Even if the courts reject the proposition that the detainees have no
rights to assert in habeas or that those rights are limited only to complaining that
they did not get to appear before a CSRT, there is still the prospect that the scope
of habeas review will be very limited if administrative-style deference is given to
the substantive determinations made by the CSRTs. Even in a world where
federal habeas courts arrogate to themselves the power to review whether a
particular detainee was or was not in fact an enemy combatant, much will
depend on their standard of review.
On this question, the U.S. government not surprisingly argues that the
habeas courts would be available only to conduct a review of the administrative
record compiled by the CSRTs under a very deferential "some evidence"
standard. 22 What this means in practice is that the habeas courts will not be
making de novo determinations of whether the detainee was, in fact, an enemy
combatant; instead, the courts will simply review what the military itself did to
make that determination and ensure that it complied with the basic standards of
23
due process and regularity. Drawing on precedents from the selective service
and immigration 24 arenas, the government argues that the courts should defer to
the determinations of the CSRTs as long as those determinations were supported
by "some evidence" - in other words, were not completely arbitrary or irrational.
The detainees envision a much more robust judicial function, in which
mini-trials will be conducted in the federal habeas courts to make new
determinations through adversarial proceedings of a particular detainee's proper
status. 25 During the pendency of the U.S. Supreme Court case, the Rasul
petitioners and their amici implied that all they really wanted were Article V

22. See, e.g., Response to Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion to Dismiss or for
Judgment as a Matter of Law and Memorandum in Support, Hicks (No. 02-CV-0299) slip op. at
43-51 (on file with author).
23. See, e.g., Eagles v. United States, 329 U.S. 304, 312 (1946).
24. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Comm'r, 273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927); Fernandez v.
Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925).
25. See, e.g., Petitioners' Joint Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Respondents' Motion to
Dismiss or for Judgment as a Matter of Law, Khalid v. Bush, Civ. No. 1:04-CV- 1142 (RJL), slip
op. at 19-31 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 2004) (on file with author).
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hearings under the Geneva Convention,26 which in truth are rather less robust
proceedings than the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. (Indeed, only three
nations have ever actually convened Article V tribunals, and one of them,
Canada, simply had a single junior military officer spend a short time listening to
an informal presentation of the detainee's tale.) It is now clear that was a Trojan
horse, as many of us have said all along. The detainees and their counsel were
not, in fact, simply seeking CSRTs or Article V hearings conducted by the
military. In truth, their agenda is to import the framework of the criminal law
into the context of modern irregular warfare and to trigger full trial-type
adversarial hearings under a de novo standard of review in the federal courts.
Leaving aside the formidable separation of powers problems inherent in this
approach, there are numerous subsidiary questions that relate to how the
habeas courts could ever sensibly adjudicate such cases. Flowing from a hint
dropped by Justice O'Connor in the Hamdi case,2 8 one significant question is
whether the U.S. government is entitled to a presumption of correctness in
determining whether the individuals it captures in battle are enemy combatants.
Put another way, can the burden of proof be shifted to the detainees to prove that
they were not in fact fighting against the United States when they were captured?
Much potentially hinges on this question given the practical absence of
admissible evidence, especially of the unclassified sort, that can establish the
identities and activities of terrorists and their fellow travelers captured on the
global battlefield.
Another important question revolves around the ability of the government
to rely on hearsay to make whatever showing it is obliged to make. If, for
example, the government may not rely on affidavits and must instead provide
live witnesses to testify to the circumstances of capture or the activities of the
detainees and to be available for cross-examination on those topics, then military
commanders and soldiers will have to be pulled back from the battle front to the
courtroom. In addition, the government will be unable to rely on one of the
principal categories of evidence it typically has in these cases: intelligence
reports provided by cooperating foreign intelligence services.

26. Rasul v. Bush, Nos. 03-334, 03-343, slip op. at 3-9 and 13-15 (U.S. Apr. 20, 2004), Oral

Argument (questioning General Olson).
27. See, e.g., Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. 493, 506 (1870) (decisions concerning "[lt]he measures to
be taken in carrying on war" belong to and "rests wholly in the discretion of those to whom the
substantial powers involved arc confided by the Constitution"); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 670
(1863) ("Whether the President in fulfilling his duties, as Commander-in-chief... [chooses] to
accord to them the character of belligerents, is a question to be decided by him, and this Court must
be governed by the decisions and acts of the political department of the Government to which this
power was entrusted.").
28. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2649 (2004).
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A similar question exists with respect to the other major category of evidence the government often has with respect to a detainee's belligerent status:
information derived from interrogations conducted by our own military or
intelligence agents. Such information might come from the detainee himself, or
it might come from other detainees whose status is not being adjudicated in the
particular case in question. It will almost always have been obtained without the
detainee having had the benefit of counsel. And it will also typically have been
obtained in circumstances that, if transported into the ordinary criminal law
context, would be regarded as coercive. In common parlance, these detainees
are anything but free to go, and they are interrogated aggressively without a
series of warnings about their presumed rights. I am not talking here about
torture or the infliction of physical pain, but rather interrogations that occur in
circumstances or under various forms of psychological pressure that would be
highly unusual if applied to a normal criminal defendant.
The third big question left completely unresolved both in Hamdi and Rasul
is the question of access to counsel and the right to counsel. Here again, there
are very active debates going on in the district court in Washington D.C. where
all of these cases have now been consolidated. The coordinating judge is Joyce
Hens Green, and other judges of the D.C. district court are handling individual
cases. The U.S. decided to provide the detainees with access to counsel for these
habeas proceedings but conditioned it on some monitoring. They wanted to
monitor writings to the detainees to ensure that classified information was not
passed to them, either deliberately or inadvertently, through their lawyers. In
some very special cases involving very dangerous, high-level Al Qaeda people,
they also wanted to monitor in real time the actual attorney/client meetings to
ensure that the detainees were not using their meetings with counsel (even if
counsel was entirely unwitting) to pass messages to confederates on the outside.
Judge Kollar-Kotelly of the D.C. district court recently disallowed such securityrelated monitoring, holding that the captured terrorists and Taliban being held at
Guantanamo must have unmonitored access to their lawyers. 29 In essence, she
imported notions of the right to counsel developed in the context of the criminal
law into the wholly different military detention setting.
In addition, some of the detainees now have CJA (Criminal Justice Act)
applications pending. 30 For these detainees, it is not enough that they should
enjoy the same right of unmonitored access to counsel as would be enjoyed by a
loyal U.S. citizen accused of a common crime; they claim, in addition, the right
29. A] Odah v. United States, No. 02-828 (CKK), slip op. at 6 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2004), available
at http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/02-828a.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2005).
30. See, e.g., Motion for Appointment of Counsel, Zemiri v. Bush, No. 04-2046 (CKK) (D.D.C.
Nov. 29, 2004) (on file with author); Petitioners' Motion for Appointment of Counsel Pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B), El-Banna v. Bush, No. 1:04-CV-01144 (RWR) (D.D.C. Sept. 24,
2004).
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to have counsel and/or litigation expenses paid for by the U.S. taxpayers - the
same taxpayers they would presumably like to slaughter in their office buildings
on a clear September morning if they could. These applications would, if
granted, result in the United States public paying for presumed terrorists to have
lawyers with which to sue our military commanders in the middle of a war. This
would not demonstrate how enlightened and humane we are; it would instead
demonstrate how warped our sensibilities have become, how little resolve we
have left to do the tough things necessary to defend freedom against its most
dangerous enemies, and how our common sense has been progressively
degraded by the steady march of our love affair with litigation.
Some of the Guantanamo detainees have also claimed that they have the
right to have their lawyers disclose classified intelligence to them. Under the
rules the Pentagon has established, lawyers with proper security clearances are
entitled to view classified evidence on which the enemy combatant determination has been based with respect to their clients. The government has actually
been quite generous in providing access to very sensitive information to the
lawyers representing the detainees.
But the detainees themselves are,
barred
from
having
access
to our nation's most sensitive secrets.
understandably,
Yet, although the court orders currently in place to regulate access to classified
information in these cases generally do not provide for access to classified
information by detainees, 23 some detainees have claimed that they cannot
effectively challenge their classification as an enemy combatant unless they see
all of the government's evidence and can discuss and evaluate it with their
lawyers. This claim is, once again, based on the view that ordinary criminal law
notions should be imported unaltered into the military context. But what may be
a perfectly reasonable, common sense proposition in the context of an ordinary
criminal trial may be a dangerous and nonsensical one as applied to captures and
detentions occurring in the course of armed conflict. This issue, too, was
unresolved in Rasul and is now before the federal courts in Washington. D.C.
Finally, there is an issue that has not yet arisen in the litigation but which
certainly will arise sooner or later, and that is the question of timing: when does
the right to consult a lawyer attach? This is a vitally important question, because
it will determine whether the U.S. military, when it takes a captured terrorist or
enemy fighter into custody, will have an opportunity to interrogate that person
effectively. If a right to counsel attaches immediately, then there will be no
period during which we can gather intelligence effectively from the detainees
because their lawyers will undoubtedly advise them not to talk and give them

3 1. MEMO FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, supra note 14, at para. c.
32. Protective Order and Procedures for Counsel Access to Detainees at the United States Naval
Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, Civ. Nos. 02-CV-0299 etc.
(consolidated cases) (D.D.C. Nov. 5, 2004) (on file with author).

TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.

[Vol. 12:1

hope by promising legal action to free them. This war, to an even greater extent
than most wars, is really about getting actionable, real-time intelligence that will
allow our military to roll up terrorist networks operating across the world.
There are a few other issues to keep your eye on that I will tick off very
quickly without discussion. First is the definition of an enemy combatant. Who
is an enemy combatant? Is a conscript who was forced to fight for the other side
an enemy combatant? Is a citizen of a terrorist group that is not Al Qaeda, but
that the President determines is working in concert with Al Qaeda an enemy
combatant for this purpose? Are people enemy combatants who provide various
kinds of material support to Al Qaeda, such as service support, transportation,
communications, or money? And who decides, the courts or the executive?
How much deference is the Executive Branch determination of those kinds of
issues going to receive?
Second, can people outside Guantanamo avail themselves of the new right
recognized by the Court in Rasul? If the words of Justice Stevens' formulation
for the majority are read literally, 33 Rasul may mean that the Court has
extended the writ across the globe. Given that, there is no reason that I can think
of currently why the Al Qaeda masterminds who were behind 9/11 and are in
custody outside of Guantanamo - top terrorists like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,
Ramzi Binalshibh, and Abu Zubayda - could not come into federal court in
Alexandria, Virginia tomorrow with actions styled Mohammed v. Goss or
Binalshibh v. Bush seeking release no matter where in the world they are being
held. It is really just a matter of time until we see people outside Guantanamo
coming in to sue, which could include some of the most high-value detainees
and intelligence sources that we have abroad, detainees and sources whose
whereabouts are undisclosed and highly classified.
Finally, there are also a whole range of issues that will be litigated with
respect to military commissions and the use of commissions to dispense military
justice for war crimes to detainees against whom charges are brought, as
34
opposed to detainees who are simply being held for the duration of the conflict.
So what does the existence of all these significant open questions tell us
about the practical consequences of Rasul? In the worst case scenario, if some
of the questions I have just described are resolved in a manner that is favorable
to the detainees and unfavorable to the executive, we will have the time and
attention of our military commanders consumed with litigation. That is
happening right now. Many of our military commanders are being forced to

33. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2698 ("No party questions the District Court's jurisdiction over
petitioners'custodians, [The habeas statute] by its terms, requires nothing more.").
34. Although unlikely to survive on appeal, Judge James Robertson's decision in Hamdan v.
Rumseld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004), appeal filed No. 04-5393 (D.C. Cir.), provides a
foretaste of some of these issues.
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spend substantial time with Department of Justice (DOJ) lawyers helping the
DOJ prepare its responses to these habeas petitions.
We will also have significantly diminished capabilities to gather intelligence through interrogation of detainees. The value of the intelligence taken
from Guantanamo, from everything I have heard, has been high. It may not have
directly stopped an imminent plot to execute another 9/11-type attack, but we
have learned a lot about Al Qaeda's methods from our interrogations of
detainees. For example, we have learned about smuggling routes through
Central America which Al Qaeda used to get its agents into this country; we
have learned about Al Qaeda methods of making and detonating explosives; we
have learned a lot about their organization and their financing. That intelligence
would be dramatically reduced, and in the worst case scenario, we could be
prevented from stopping another 9/11, if there were an immediate right of
counsel that attached to detainees captured worldwide.
There will also be civil suits. A short while ago, four detainees who had
been released from Guantanamo sued the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for $10 million each. 35 It is worth repeating again
that this came in the middle of a war. The suits allege that Secretary Rumsfeld
and General Myers permitted or allowed these detainees to be held under abusive
conditions or to be tortured. 36 If these detainees have any success at all, this will
become a routine claim going forward. And success need only be defined as
surviving a motion to dismiss, such that the suits will impose costs and burdens
on the defendants and on the United States while we try to prosecute this war.
There are also abundant propaganda and harassment opportunities presented by
having recourse to the habeas courts and the ability to file complaints against
senior government officials, no matter how spurious or false the allegations may
be. In addition, the existence of the habeas remedy will threaten our Allies'
ability to entrust prisoners to us because they will then fear being brought into
litigation in U.S. courts. These cases may also eventually compromise our
ability to protect - and therefore receive - sensitive intelligence from foreign
sources.
My closing point about the practical consequences of Rasul is also potentially the most interesting and most ironic. Rasul will, unless carefully cabined
by the lower courts, result in the erroneous release of committed enemies of the
United States who will return to the fight against us. This is interesting and
ironic because the fundamental reason for the international law of armed conflict
- and for the traditional rule that when you capture an enemy in battle, you can

35. Karla Crosswhite-Chigbue, FourBritish Gitmo Detainees sue: Claim they were drugged
strippednaked and chained, Nov. 27, 2004, CNN.COM INT'L, at
http://edition.cnn.ciml2004/LAW/10/27/gitmo.lawsuit (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
36. See generally id.
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hold him for the duration of the conflict without charging him and without
providing him lawyers - is to minimize the length and suffering of war by,
among other things, preventing captured combatants from returning to the fight
and thereby prolonging it. That central humanitarian rationale and wellspring for
this body of law will actually be undermined here in the name of humanitarian
principles. Imagine it: individuals whom our soldiers have risked or perhaps
even given their lives to take into custody will be released and will find their
way to the battlefield again to force some other son of some other American
family to risk or give his life in order to subdue or capture them once again.
This is not a flight of fancy. This is happening right now. In part due to
litigation pressure, in part due to diplomatic pressure, and in part due to public
pressure, we have already released approximately 150 individuals who were
once held at Guantanamo. 37 This trend will undoubtedly accelerate if courts take
an active role in trying to determine who our military should really keep control
over.
These releases include many mistakes, which is not surprising given the
assiduous efforts Al Qaeda agents are trained to make to deceive their captors.
Already, there are at least ten confirmed cases in which individuals we have
released believing them not to constitute a threat have gone back into battle
against us.38 Two of them were killed recently in Afghanistan
and were
39
identified after they were killed. Another has been recaptured.
There is also an individual in Denmark named Abderrahmane whom the
Danish government put a lot of pressure on us to release. Responding to that
pressure, we released him, but only after he signed a pledge abjuring jihad and
swearing he would not make war against the United States. Upon release, he
gave a number of press interviews and has become quite a celebrity in Denmark.
To make a long story short, the Danes were recently forced to seize his passport
when he tried to go to Chechnya to resume jihad. He offered the view that the
pledge he signed procuring his release from Guantanamo is mere "toilet

37. Gitmo Detainees Return to Terror,CBSNEWS.cOM, Oct. 17, 2004, at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/09/24/terror/main645493.shtml (last visited Jan. 5, 2005);
Matt Moore & John Lumpkin, Some ex-prisoners are returningto terrorism;but pentagon says
most honor pledge, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 18, 2004, at
http://www.freep.com/news/nw/terr18e_20041018.htm.
38. See generally Shaun Waterman, Freed Gitmo detainees back in rebel ranks, officials say,
WASHINGTONTIMES.COM, July 6, 2004, at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20040706-125552-4477r.htm
(last visited Jan. 12,
2005); John Mitz, Released Detainees Rejoining The Fight, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 22, 2004, at
A01.

39. See generally Ex-Gitmo detainees return to terror, WASHINGTONTIMES.COM, Oct. 18, 2004, at
http://washingtontimes.com/national/20041018-124854-2279r.htm; Mitz, supra note 33.
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paper."
He has also since expressed the view that the Danish Prime Minister
who worked so hard for his release is a legitimate military target in the war on
terror. 41 Most Danes originally saw his release as a victory; now, many Danes
are starting to wonder who and what his release really represented a victory for.
Likewise, there is an individual named Abdullah Mehsud in Pakistan, who
has been giving a lot of press interviews, boasting how he fooled his U.S.
interrogators into believing that he was a mere tribesman in Afghanistan. In fact,
he is a hardened jihadi with ties to Al Qaeda. We had him in our custody in
Guantanamo, but now he is taking aid workers hostage and leading a Taliban
combat unit in the field against our soldiers.42
These are just some of the really perverse and dangerous practical consequences that could eventuate if the post-Rasul litigation in the lower courts turns
out wrong. The prospect that the litigation could turn out wrong - or at
minimum, take many years and many trips to the Supreme Court to resolve forces one to ask a final, important question: is the path we are now on really
the right one institutionally for resolving these questions? What Rasul has made
clear is that the legal landscape governing the rights of alien military detainees
held abroad will not be defined by the Executive Branch alone, contrary to the
Administration's initial hope. Instead, one way or another, the rules governing
military detentions will emerge through an interbranch dialogue. Right now, the
dialogue is ongoing between the Executive and the Judiciary.
But the
institutional limitations and disabilities of the Judiciary, and the comparative
competence of the Congress in weighing significant policy implications like
those I've just described, almost certainly means that this is a conversation better
had between the political branches.
With both Houses of Congress in
Republican hands, the Administration should have far less to fear from a
legislative process than it otherwise might. And given the record of the courts so
far in addressing these questions, there is a strong case to made that a more
expeditious, more nuanced, and ultimately more sensible resolution of the
conflicting claims of individual rights and collective security will be arrived at
by engaging in a forthright and constructive policymaking process with the

40. Danish detainee 'to join rebels,'BBC NEWS WORLD EDITION, Sept. 30, 2004, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3704176.stm (last visited Jan. 12, 2005).
41. Id.
42. See Tim McGirk, After Gitmo, Back to Terror, TIME, Oct. 25, 2004, available at
http:l/www.time.comtime/archive/preview/0 10987,1101041025-725097,00.html (last visited Jan.
27, 2005); Lisa Myers, Ex-GuantanamoDetainee Turns to Terrorism, MSNBC News, Oct. 21,
2004, at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/6300363 (last visited Jan. 27, 2005); see also Pakistan Puts
Bounty on Militant, BBC NEWS WORLD EDITION Dec. 17, 2004, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south-asia/4 10 4 5 8 9 .stm (last visited Jan. 27, 2005); Daniel Cooney, ExGuantanamo PrisonerHeads Militants Who Threaten to Kill Kidnapped Chinese Engineers, AP
NEWS, Oct. 12, 2004, at http://ap.tbo.com/ap/breakingMGBBFYTE80E.html (last visited Jan. 27,
2004).
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people's elected representatives than by continuing to allow the agenda to be set
by the detainees and the decisions to be made by unelected judges who typically
have little or no background, training, or expertise in military or national security
affairs.

